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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
make it mandatory on the court to give custody of the child only to
those of the same religion.25  The dissenting opinion points out that
since the pertinent Massachusetts and New York statutes regarding
the religious consideration are nearly identical, and since the Massa-
chusetts statute was patterned after that of New York, it should be
given the same interpretation as in New York-namely, that the re-
ligion of the child be considered with as much, if not more, emphasis
than its material welfare.2 6
The majority opinion is not sound. The court is the protector
of the child, and its primary concern is the child's welfare. It is in-
conceivable, therefore, that a judge may jeopardize the religion of a
helpless child by permitting its adoption into a family of different
religious affiliations. As evidenced by the instant decision, the court
is in effect claiming that it has the same prerogative of uninhibited
discretion now, as it had before the new statute was added.27 Does
the law exist for naught? Yes, if the judge may disregard the man-
date and freely pursue his own course.
As the dissent implied, the spiritual benefit of retaining one's
own religion is of a higher nature, and greater value to a child,
whether or not he now realizes it, than the material benefits he may
reap by adoption into a wealthy family of different religious beliefs. 28
Although that family may sincerely offer him the best in life, the fact
remains that the child's religion may be torn from him. The uni-
versal standard in adoption proceedings, "the welfare of the child,"
should therefore be construed to include its spiritual as well as its
material welfare. The legislature apparently felt that no man, or
body of men, has the right to expose a child to the possible loss of
its original faith, by allowing its adoption into a family of different
religious affiliations: the child is to be reared in the faith into which
it was born.
A
EQUITY-INJUNCTION-PROPERTY RIGHT IN USE OF MARITAL
NAME.-Defendant-husband obtained an ex parte Mexican divorce,1
those of a different religious belief, was responsible for petitioners' failure to
obtain the necessary report.
-5 See Note, 23 A. L. R. 2d 701 (1952), and cases collected therein.
26 See Petition of Gally, 107 N. E. 2d 21, 29, 30 (Mass. 1952).
27 The statutory use of the phrase, "when practicable," may have induced the
court to assume that it should exercise its discretion according to the attendant
facts and circumstances, and decree accordingly. Id., 107 N. E. 2d at 25.28 See id., 107 N. E. 2d at 28.
'Following principles of comity, the court determined the plaintiff's mar-
ital status by holding this decree void, inasmuch as it was procured by a New
York resident on a twenty-four hour visit.
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remarried, and is now living with a second woman who uses the title
of and claims to be his wife. Plaintiff, the defendant's first wife, al-
leges that unfavorable public doubt has thus been cast upon her mari-
tal status. Ancillary to this action for declaratory judgment, an in-
junction was granted restraining the second "wife" from using the
defendant's name and holding herself out as his wife. Held, the plain-
tiff has a property right in her marital status and the protection of
her good name. Niver v. Niver, 200 Misc. 993, 111 N. Y. S. 2d 889
(Sup. Ct. 1951).
When equity was first developing as a system of jurisprudence,
property rights were of paramount importance, and the jurisdiction
of the Chancellor was limited to their protection.2  Consequently, in
1818, Lord Eldon dispelled any remaining doubt as to whether or
not equity would expand its jurisdiction beyond the protection of
property rights, by reaffirming the rule that equity will not act where
mere personal rights are involved.3
In England, it has been held that there is no exclusive right in
a name justifying injunctive relief to restrain its unauthorized use
by another.4 A man might therefore freely assume any name; 5
except that if the adoption of the new name would expose another
to pecuniary loss, 6 an injunction would be granted, especially if there
was a business involved3
Recognizing that some personal rights may be infringed upon
with impunity, some authorities have suggested that the jurisdiction
of equity be extended for their protection, rather than be limited
solely to cases affecting some proprietary interest.8 Accordingly, as
American law developed, various means were devised for the pro-
tection of non-property rights,9 by a broader interpretation of a
2 DE FUNiAx, HANDBOOK OF MODER EQuiTy §§ 3, 53 (1950).
8 See Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402, 426, 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 678 (1818).
4 Cowley v. Cowley, [1901] A. C. 450; see DuBoulay v. DuBoulay, 6 Moo.
P. C. N. S. 32, 47, 16 Eng. Rep. 638, 644 (1869) (". . . [T]he mere assump-
tion of a name . . . by a Stranger who had never before been called by that
name, whatever cause of annoyance it may be to the family, is a grievance for
which our Law affords no redress.").
5 See note 4 supra; 23 HALSBURY'S LAws OF ENGLAND 555 (2d ed. 1936).
6 Routh v. Webster, 10 Beav. 561, 50 Eng. Rep. 698 (1847) (plaintiff
falsely named as trustee of a business enterprise).
7 Walter v. Ashton, [1902] 2 Ch. 282 (name of plaintiff's business appro-
priated by defendant for sale of cycles).
8 Berrien v. Pollitzer, 165 F. 2d 21 (D. C. Cir. 1947) (exclusion of plain-
tiff from National Woman's Party headquarters) ; Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf
Club, 30 Cal. 2d 110, 180 P. 2d 321 (1947) (ejection of plaintiff from race
track premises); .tzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905),
aff'd, 117 La. 708, 42 So. 228 (1906) (inspector of police prevented from
placing plaintiff's photograph in rogue's gallery); see Pound, Equitable Relief
Against Defamation And Injuries To Personalty, 29 HAgv. L. REv. 640 (1916) ;
Chaffee, The Progress Of The Lau , 1919-1920, Equitable Relief Against
Torts, 34 HARv. L. Rlv. 388, 407 (1921).
9 'In recent years, personal rights have assumed a more important and rec-
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jurisdictional statute,10 and open assertions of jurisdiction by the
courts." The use of another's name has been enjoined in a few cases
without a judicial explanation of the nature of the right involved, or
of the extent of equity's jurisdiction.1 2  Some courts, while ostensibly
adhering to the general rule, have protected rights substantially per-
sonal in nature, e.g., the right to security from molestation, 13 or to
protection from the use of plaintiff's name by a third party's child.14
The apparent anomaly resulted from a judicial attempt to find some
sort of property right that would support the injunction.
An early New York decision 15 denied injunctive relief to pre-
vent the unauthorized use of the plaintiff's name, on the sole ground
that no property right was affected.16 The specific question of
whether equity's jurisdiction should be extended to protect personal
rights was later raised in Baumann v. Baumann,17 the facts of which
closely resembled those in the instant case. The court, however, left
this question unanswered, for in denying the injunction, it rested
its decision on the absence of a legal wrong-injury to feelings not
being considered such-rather than on the specific ground that equity
has no jurisdiction to protect these rights.'8 Although the decision
ognized place in the field of law. Civil rights statutes, rights of privacy, the
larger recognition of a right to damages for injuries to the feelings or mental
suffering,-those all indicate the growth of personal as distinguished from
strictly property rights." Note, 14 A. L. R. 295 (1921).
IoTFx. Civ. STAT. fit. 76, art. 4642 (Vernon, 1948), Hawks v. Yancey, 265
S. W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) (article 4643 referred to in this case is
presently article 4642).
11 See note 7 supra.
12 Gale v. Gale, 49 Cal. App. 2d 301, 121 P. 2d 778 (1942) (marital name);
Burns v. Stevens, 236 Mich. 443, 210 N. W. 482 (1926) (marital name) ; State
v. Hinkle, 131 Wash. 86, 229 Pac. 317 (1924) (unauthorized use of plaintiff's
name in connection with a political party).
13 Reed v. Carter, 268 Ky. 1, 103 S. W. 2d 663 (1937); Stark v. Hamilton,
149 Ga. 227, 99 S. E. 861 (1919).
14Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N. J. Eq. 910, 67 Atl. 97 (Ct. Err. & App.
1907).
15 Hodecker v. Strickler, 39 N. Y. Supp. 515 (Sup. Ct. 1896), aff'd, 20
App. Div. 245, 46 N. Y. Supp. 808 (4th Dep't 1897) (Defendant, who was liv-
ing with the plaintiff's husband, was using his surname.).
Is "The possibility that others may be misled by the assumed relation ...
does not concern the plaintiff, unless by that means some of her property rights
or interests may be brought in question; and until then she has no legal cause
of complaint . . . ." Hodecker v. Strickler, 39 N. Y. Supp. 515, 517 (Sup.
Ct. 1896).
'1 132 Misc. 217, 228 N. Y. Supp. 539 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mern., 224 App.
Div. 719 (1st Dep't 1928), rev'd in part, 250 N. Y. 382, 165 N. E. 819 (1929).is "We do not find it necessary to discuss the question of the jurisdiction of
equity to grant injunctive relief in cases where there are no property rights
involved. It is sufficient for the decision in this case that there exists no legal
wrong which gives rise to a correlative legal right." Id. at 389, 165 N. E. at
822.
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in the Baumann case has been severely criticized,19 subsequent New
York decisions have recognized it as precedent, 20 refusing to enjoin
the unauthorized use of a plaintiff's name unless it interfered with a
property right.2 1
To support the injunction granted in the instant case, the court
recognized a property right in a name. In so doing, however, it
merely stated that a wife has "... a property right in the ... pro-
tection of her good name . . " without giving any interpretation
of, or authority for, that phrase.
22
Although it would be difficult to predict the outcome of a future
case on the same facts, this present decision follows an apparent ten-
dency of modern equity to protect personal rights by liberalizing the
traditionally rigid concept of property rights.
M
PRACTICE AND PLEADING- STATUTE OF LImITATIONS - MAL-
PRAcTiE.-Defendant-physician performed two unauthorized opera-
tions on plaintiff, on January 14, 1949, but plaintiff was not informed
of these until January 28, 1949. This malpractice' suit was com-
menced on January 20, 1951. The defendant's motion to dismiss
was granted on the ground that the action was barred by the two
year personal injury statute of limitations.2 The Georgia Court of
19 See Baumann v. Baumann, supra note 18 at 390-5, 165 N. E. at 822-4(dissenting opinions) ; see Niote, 4 ST. JoHN 's L. Rzv. 100 (1929).
20 See Lowe v. Lowe, 241 App. Div. 711, 269 N. Y. Supp. 994 (1st Dep't),
rev'd, 265 N. Y. 197, 192 N. E. 291 (1934); Somberg v. Somberg, 238 App.
Div. 723, 265 N. Y. Supp. 223 (1st Dep't 1933), reefd, 263 N. Y. 1, 188 N. E.
137 (1934); Metlis v. Metlis, 104 N. Y. S. 2d 407 (Sup. Ct. 1951) ; Marquis
v. Marquis, 178 Misc. 702, 35 N. Y. S. 2d 675 (Sup. Ct. 1942); cf. Spitzer
v. Spitzer, 191 Misc. 343, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 279 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Fondiller v.
Fondiller, 182 Misc. 628, 50 N. Y. S. 2d 393 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Kiebler v.
Kiebler, 170 Misc. 81, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
21 Kranz v. Kranz, 169 Misc. 658, 7 N. Y. S. 2d 830 (Sup. Ct. 1938)
(confusion of names deprived plaintiff of opportunities to obtain gainful
employment).
22 Niver v. Niver, 200 Misc. 993, 995, 111 N. Y. S. 2d 889, 891 (Sup. Ct.
1951).
1 "Malpractice . . . means bad or unskillful practice, resulting in injury
to the patient, and comprises all acts and omissions of a physician or surgeon
as such to a patient as such, which may make the physician or surgeon either
civilly or criminally liable.' H-azoo, MEDICAL JUaRsIrmc 153, § 180
(1931). It has been stated that an unauthorized operation, while an assault
and battery, is also malpractice, even though no negligence is charged. Physi-
cians' and Dentists' Bureau v. Dray, 8 Wash. 2d 38, 111 P. 2d 568 (1941);
see Bakewell v. Kahle, 232 P. 2d 127, 129 (Mont. 1951).
2 The remedy for malpractice in some jurisdictions, including Georgia, lies
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